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Liberty of conscience is central to liberal conceptions of toleration. One tradition that 
runs from John Locke (1983) through John Rawls (2005) holds that liberty of conscience 
is a fundamental right. A conception of the person as free and equal is a primary moral 
basis for toleration on this view. John Stuart Mill (1978) represents another tradition.  On 
his view, utility is the moral basis for toleration and liberty of conscience.  Both 
collective and individual interests are best promoted by a policy of toleration that extends 
to religious among other value commitments.  The limits to liberty are set by the harm 
principle: toleration extends to beliefs and actions that do not cause or pose a significant 
risk of harm to others.   Political philosophers in both traditions claim that liberty of 
conscience is a fundamental feature to a liberal conception of toleration.   
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Recent proposals on how modern, diverse, and multi-religious states can best 
honor their commitments to toleration and liberty of conscience are often efforts to adapt 
ideas from traditional liberal thought to contemporary political and legal contexts.  Two 
influential views are the neutrality and equality approaches to liberty of conscience 
(Patten, 2017; Nussbaum, 2008). Defenders of neutrality claim that a tolerant state is one 
whose policies are neutral toward religious values and practices.  Others claim that 
toleration is best realized by a commitment to religious equality, one that treats each 
religious practice and conviction without favoritism or prejudice.  Some argue that since 
religious values as a class are special, a liberal state can give some preferential treatment 
to religious exemption claims.  Critics of this view reasonably argue that for reasons of 
fairness a tolerant state will treat religious and non-religious values with equal regard 
(Leiter, 2012; Perry, 2018).   
 This chapter proceeds as follows. Part I briefly sets out main ideas in the Locke-
Rawls and Mill traditions on toleration and liberty of conscience. Part II examines 
contemporary neutrality and equality approaches to toleration and liberty of conscience.  
Part III considers three challenges. First is the claim that toleration should mean the same 
thing for religious and non-religious convictions.  Second, whether liberal toleration 
requires a secular state. Third, the legitimate worry that prevailing conceptions of 
toleration and liberty of conscious are objectionably exclusionary.  Part IV concludes 
with a brief comment on issues for future research and reflection. 
I Two Models of Toleration and Liberty of Conscience 
In its contemporary form the Locke-Rawls paradigm holds that citizens and government 
must tolerate the religious convictions of persons whatever their content, unless such 
 3 
convictions imperil the rights of others.  Although there is common ground within this 
tradition of liberalism, it is important to highlight some important differences. 
Locke famously claimed that atheists, Catholics, and ‘Turks’ ought not to be 
tolerated because they cannot be trusted to honor a social contract between citizens to 
uphold rights to life, liberty, and property (Locke, 1978).  On this view, atheists are 
excluded from the group of persons to be tolerated because, fearing no divine sanctions 
for breaking their promises, they are unreliable partners to a social contract.  If you 
cannot trust an atheist to keep her or his promise then you cannot trust an atheist to 
comply with the terms of one of the most important promises of all, the social contract.  
Catholics on Locke’s view are conflicted, as are ‘Turks’, which is Locke’s conflation of 
Muslims with Muslim citizens of the Ottoman state.  The political loyalty of a Catholic or 
‘Turk’ to a liberal state, according to Locke, will be mitigated their loyalty to the Papacy 
or the Ottoman Sultan.  
On a charitable interpretation Locke is committed to something like the following 
loyalty test: Do they endorse a view at odds with the essential requirements for a social 
contract between citizens committed to a liberal state?  If ‘yes’, toleration does not extend 
to them.  Citizens can reasonably be expected to endorse a model of political authority 
whose jurisdictional authority over civil affairs is not compromised by the authority of a 
religious institution.  Yet in actuality Locke formulates the limits of toleration in a way 
that affirms pre-existing prejudices as well as seriously misinformed beliefs about 
political and religious authority within Islam.   
Locke’s conception of political morality also explicitly depends on his conception 
of Christian morality.  Locke states that his Letter Concerning Toleration expresses “my 
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thoughts about the mutual toleration of Christians” (Locke, 1978: 23).  The political 
morality that is the basis for his account of political authority, liberty, and equality is a 
Christian conception of natural law.   
Contemporary liberals in the Lockean tradition defend more inclusive conceptions 
of toleration and seek in general to extend the limits of toleration as far as possible within 
the boundaries of basic rights.  Robert Nozick’s (1974) famous construal of negative 
rights as side-constraints offers a model on how to formulate this idea: there are some 
things a person can do on the basis of her religious convictions that no one has a right to 
interfere with.  Toleration understood in this way will not be objectionably exclusionary 
in that way Locke’s position was.  Yet we’ll see in Part III that challenging issues remain 
for any attempt to defend an inclusive conception of toleration. 
After his turn to political liberalism Rawls (2005) sought to present the case for 
liberal toleration in a way that could unite as many persons who are committed to fair 
terms for social cooperation as possible.  Toleration extends, up to a point, to political 
philosophy itself.  Provided someone is willing to seek fair terms for social cooperation 
in a state committed to treating each citizen as free and equal, she is to be tolerated.  
Someone’s commitment to a minority or any religion is irrelevant in the sense that 
anyone willing to abide by the fair terms for social cooperation is entitled to liberty of 
conscience and the full protections of an inclusive tolerant state.   
One important difference between Locke and Rawls centers on whether adherence 
to a religious tradition by itself is good evidence that someone is or is not committed to 
respecting the terms of the social contract. For Locke it is. For Rawls it is not.  The fact 
that citizens committed to coexisting in a liberal state have widely diverging views about 
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religion, moral, political, and other values, is a compelling reason to accommodate rather 
than alienate—as Locke’s liberalism does—those who accept fair terms for social 
cooperation.  Greater sensitivity toward the fact of pluralism has led to new ways of 
thinking about the moral basis for toleration. One result of this is the realization that a 
commitment to the idea of all persons as free and equal requires a conception of 
toleration that is more inclusive.  
Despite philosophical differences it is appropriate to refer to a tradition in liberal 
thought as the Locke-Rawls paradigm.  Like any tradition, liberalism is internally 
pluralistic.  Yet this pluralism does not mean there are no meaningful ways to highlight 
common ground between Locke and Rawls. For example, political philosophers in this 
tradition can agree that how we think about toleration and liberty of conscience should be 
compatible with the idea of persons as free and equal.  By contrast, utility is the basis for 
toleration according to Mill.  
Mill characterizes liberty of conscience in a way that encompasses freedom of 
thought in general (Mill, 1978).  Persons can express themselves on all matters unless 
when doing so they cause harm or pose an immanent risk of harm to other persons.  
Liberty of conscience is part of a more general defense of liberty that includes religious, 
cultural, political, and artistic freedoms.  The moral basis for this view is utility: 
protecting the liberty of the individual serves both her own and society’s interests in 
maximizing happiness.  Moreover, like his predecessor Bentham, Mill’s conception of 
political morality is secular.  Utility, according to Mill, is not in opposition to religion, 
nor does it depend upon a religious morality.  The case for liberal toleration is further 
bolstered by a recognition of the ‘progressive’ potential in human nature, which for Mill 
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consists of an open-ended potential for moral, political, and cultural improvement 
(Rawls, 2007: 301-03). Toleration is important in part because it serves this permanent 
interest of both the individual and the human community.   
Liberty and other liberal values form a core part of what Mill termed ‘the 
principles of the modern world’.  These principles include liberty, marriage equality, 
equal treatment under law, and freedom of occupation (Mill, 2007; Rawls, 2007: 297).  
The toleration required by the liberty principle is understood by Mill to be part of a set of 
principles that work to advance the interests of all persons in an open society. 
 A central component of Mill’s approach to toleration and liberty of conscience is 
a strong anti-paternalism.  Neither government nor citizens are permitted to use coercion 
to stop persons from exercising their liberty of conscience on grounds that such 
restrictions are in the interest of those whose freedom is curtailed.  For example, in his 
interesting discussion of Mormon polygamy Mill announces his own objections, targeting 
in particular the patriarchy within Mormon marriage practices (Mill, 1978).  Yet Mill 
defends a classical liberal standpoint by distinguishing coercive intervention from the 
free expressing of attitudes about the practices that are tolerated. Citizens are free to state 
their positions on nearly any topic. When they express opposition to a religious practice 
on grounds that it is patriarchal, they do not violate the requirement to tolerate something 
they object to.  Mill does not conflate toleration with endorsement. Citizens are free to try 
to persuade, cajole, and argue with their fellow citizens about how they choose to 
exercise their liberty.  By contrast, when the state prohibits freely constituted marriage 
practices that a majority finds repulsive, and when the harm principle does not authorize 
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intervention, liberty is replaced by tyranny, whether of the majority or of some other 
power that lacks a moral justification for its coercive intervention.   
That liberty is not a license to dominate others is central to the harm principle.  
Liberty imposes a strong duty of non-interference that is defeasible only when persons 
harm or pose a significant risk of harm to others.  A practice that results in non-
consensual domination should not be tolerated.  Yet when citizens claim they wish to 
freely exercise their liberty in ways that many find objectionable, the burden for 
intervening to prohibit should be on those who want to intervene, and not those who want 
to exercise their liberty. 
 Mill’s view differs from the Locke-Rawls paradigm in three important respects. 
The first is that utility rather than a moral conception of the person is the moral basis for 
liberty of conscience.  Instead of invoking the intrinsic worth of persons Mill, like other 
utilitarians, claims that the primary moral value is happiness.  Liberty of conscience and 
other liberal principles are grounded in utility.  The second is that harm to others rather 
than denying an inviolable moral status of the person is the criterion for deciding when to 
restrict liberty of conscience.  Harm to others is a common variable in both traditions of 
liberal thought, yet the conception of harm that justifies coercive intervention differs 
across the two traditions.  Mill emphasizes harm to the welfare of other persons, whereas 
the Locke-Rawls tradition emphasizes the intrinsic moral worth of persons, which is 
taken to be the basis for fundamental rights.  Rights are important to a Millian conception 
of toleration, yet rights are grounded in utility and limited by the harm principle. Rights 
occupy a different space in the moral architecture of the two traditions of liberalism. A 
third important difference concerns the moral basis for the political authority that 
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enforces liberal values, including toleration and liberty of conscience.  Mill follows 
Hume (2015) and others in rejecting social contract theory.  According to the non-
contractarian liberal, political authority is justified when exercised according to the right 
political values, such as liberty and equality.  The social contract tradition of which 
Locke and Rawls are paradigm figures claims that some form of consent—real, tacit, or 
hypothetical—is a condition for political authority, including the authority to enforce a 
right to liberty of conscience.  The contractarian and non-contractarian liberal traditions 
thus disagree about the basis for the political authority to enforce a commitment to 
toleration and liberty of conscience.  Non-contractarian liberals agree that consent plays 
an important role in a liberal society, for example, in commerce and in decisions about 
whether to join a religious community.  Yet the idea of a social contract as the basis for 
political authority is rejected. 
 The harm principle can be invoked in ways that do not depend on Mill’s 
utilitarian liberalism.  For example, some contemporary positions appeal to a rights-based 
rather than utility-based conception of liberty.  Others such as Feinberg (1984: 18) defend 
a conception of harm that can justify coercive intervention without taking a stand on 
whether the moral basis for this conception is utility, rights-based, or contractarian.  
Cohen (2014) develops a theory of toleration in the tradition of Feinberg which extends 
the anti-paternalism implied by the harm principle to a range of contemporary debates.  
This more recent work has shown that one can creatively combine ideas from different 
conceptions of the liberal political values.  Though the focus here has been on Mill’s 
version, the harm principle can be adapted to different conceptions of liberal political 
morality. 
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On matters of law and policy there is a lot of common ground between liberals 
who affirm different conceptions of liberal values.  Liberal political philosophers 
typically favor a civil libertarian conception liberty of conscience. Mormons, Muslims, 
Zoroastrians, atheists and others, should be tolerated with respect to their various faiths, 
convictions, and traditions. They also typically agree that that government should not 
promote sectarian religious viewpoints.  On matters of conscience, most liberals will 
concur that toleration requires a religiously non-sectarian state, the accommodation of 
non-traditional and minority religious viewpoints, as well as liberty of conscience for 
non-religious values.   
The features to liberal thought that hold across traditions of liberalism help to 
explain the relative agreement on a number of policies designed to protect liberty of 
conscience.  For example, it is unlikely that a liberal political philosopher will endorse 
forcing religious citizens to make public pledges to secular symbols if such citizens 
object on religious grounds.  Liberal political philosophers will also oppose obstructionist 
efforts on the part of citizens or government to make it harder for religious minorities to 
build a place of worship or to engage in religious practices.  Tyranny of the majority was 
a special concern of Mill in part because he recognized that democratic states are often 
dominated by majorities who are able to use their power in ways advantageous to 
themselves and harmful to minorities.  The treatment of Mormons and Catholics in the 
19th C America (Smith, 2015), and Muslims today in both Europe and the U.S., confirms 
the salience Mill’s concern.  Moreover, an immigration policy that makes it harder for 
members of one religious group to migrate for travel, study, or residency is on its face 
intolerant in ways liberal political philosophers oppose.   
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Those in the Rawlsian tradition hold that to protect against the tyranny of the 
majority formal recognition of basic rights is not sufficient. The fair value of liberty will 
not be realized if relations between citizens are marked by significant status and material 
inequalities. Likewise, toleration does not require permitting people to opt out of policies 
that serve a compelling state interest, such as immunizing a population from polio.  From 
the standpoint of liberal toleration polio and polygamy differ.  Polio is a threat to that is 
hard to protect against without a vaccine, and unvaccinated persons pose a risk to those 
too young for a vaccine or those whose vaccines are defective.  There is no analogy here 
with polygamy because, ‘protecting oneself from the harm of polygamy’ is a matter of 
choice in a way the protecting oneself from communicable diseases that others may carry 
is not. To be sure, some idealizations are being made here about marriage.  In a gender 
inegalitarian society, other factors are on the scale.  A feminist liberal perspective can 
offer guidance on whether the conditions for consent in marriage are reasonably satisfied 
or not (Brake, 2012).  Likewise, both the harm principle and the idea of persons as free an 
equal will weigh the interests of third parties, including children, whether the issue is 
public health, marriage, or any number of other examples that generate conflicts between 
what people claim they have a liberty to do and the limits of toleration. 
 The discussion here is not meant to be a contribution to Locke, Mill, or Rawls 
scholarship, but is instead a highlighting of central features to liberal conceptions of 
toleration and liberty of conscience.  We can better understand contemporary debates by 
appreciating how they draw from ancestral versions of the liberal values that animate 
contemporary debates.  In that respect historical trends in liberalism are important to how 
toleration and liberty of conscience are examined here.  The sketch just provided is 
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framed with an eye toward contemporary debates, which is the focus of the rest of the 
chapter. 
II Toleration, Neutrality, and Religious Equality 
Part I briefly considered representative positions on toleration and liberty of conscience 
from the history of liberal thought.  Even granting that some ideas are settled, such as 
persons hold moral claims against many forms of coercion that restrict their liberty, there 
are a number of controversies about how best to realize toleration and liberty of 
conscience.  Some controversies concern how liberal states try to promote toleration and 
protect liberty of conscience through law.  For example, by what criterion can we judge 
someone’s complaint that her liberty of conscience has not been respected? When does 
accommodating one person or group create an unfair burden for another person or group?  
Does the American practice of giving preferential treatment to exercises in religious over 
non-religious conscience violate equal treatment? One way to grapple with these 
questions is by proposing neutrality as a criterion for evaluating state policy. A second is 
to defend religious equality as the best way to protect citizens from religious intolerance.  
This section considers contemporary views on neutrality and religious equality 
that emphasize how different principles can work together in the service of toleration. 
Neutrality and religious equality are not mutually exclusive, although at times they will 
be considered separately in what follows. One can argue for example that state neutrality 
is a means to the realization of religious equality.  Just as political philosophers argue in 
different ways for priority relations between principles (e.g. fair equality of opportunity 
over the difference principle) this architecture is also possible for principles within a 
conception of toleration.   
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To motivate thinking about neutrality and equality we can consider an example. 
Suppose we claim that an immigration policy that severely restricts immigration from a 
number of Muslim majority states is objectionable.  Perhaps we claim such a policy too 
closely resembles the discredited Chinese exclusion policies in late 19th and early 20th C 
America (Mahoney, 2019).  One way to express this judgment is to claim that the policy 
is intolerant because it fails to treat prospective Muslim immigrants in the same way it 
treats prospective Christian immigrants. On its face such a policy looks like an instance 
of official religious inequality.  By contrast, one might defend the policy by showing the 
intent behind the policy has nothing to do with religious identity, but instead some other 
factor, such as national security.  If there are unusually high numbers of bogus passports 
that are difficult to detect, a lawmaker might invoke this as a reason for greater scrutiny 
for visa applicants from some countries. On this view, if the reasons for the policy are 
what matter, and if these reasons are neutral towards religious groups, the disparate 
impact would not imply the policy is illegitimate. One issue here is deciding which is 
more salient when assessing a claim to neutrality: intent or impact.  Which should be 
emphasized might depend on other factors, such as whether the state in question has a 
history of objectionably exclusionary policies that disfavor members of a religious group 
affected by the policy. In such cases, the suspicion level that a state is attempting to 
defend its policy in bad faith is elevated.  A conception of toleration should give us 
resources to expose bad faith efforts to invoke what is presented as a fair principle, but 
which is really an effort at rationalization in order to confer ‘legitimacy’ on an 
objectionable policy.  Recent accounts of neutrality and religious equality are offered in 
part to address practical questions like these. 
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In the contemporary context Alan Patten (2014; 2017) defends one of the most 
compelling conceptions of neutrality.  His view bases the idea of neutrality on fair 
equality of opportunity for self-determination (FOSD). This formulation has the virtue of 
making clear that neutrality is not a foundational principle. Rather, neutrality serves its 
purpose by helping us determine whether state policy treats each of its citizens as they 
deserve to be treated.  A recent defense of religious equality is defended by Martha 
Nussbaum (2008).  On her view religious toleration is required in part because the 
capacity for liberty of conscience deserves appraisal respect (Leiter, 2012; Maclure, 
2018).  On this view, there are good moral reasons to treat religious conscience in a way 
that affirms its intrinsic value. Nussbaum uses examples from American political and 
legal history to illustrate success and failure stories.  She favors the religious exemption 
model sometimes affirmed in First Amendment jurisprudence according to which 
religious exemption claims should sometimes be accommodated.  
 Neutrality is not foundational to a liberal conception of morality, because it 
depends upon a more basic set of principles (Patten, 2014).  Like toleration, which 
depends on a concept of the person, utility or some other basic value, neutrality is a 
“normatively dependent concept” (Forst, 2017: 1).  For example, on Patten’s view fair 
equality of opportunity is prior to neutrality.  Thinking about neutrality in relation to 
other political values helps us see how a neutrality standard can serve as a basis for 
evaluating law and policy. Consider a policy that prohibits slaughtering animals within 
city limits.  Posed abstractly, ‘is the policy legitimate?’ might seem straightforward if we 
are envisioning the policy as motivated to stop animal cruelty.  Rationales for the policy 
could include: public health, limiting cruelty to animals, or regulating the production of 
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meat products.  Each on its own looks like a permissible reason for a policy. Yet suppose 
there is a religious minority committed to the ritual slaughter of chickens.  If those whose 
religious practices are curtailed by the policy claim that their right to liberty of 
conscience is unfairly restricted, how should we reply?  A neutrality test might help us 
decide how best to answer.  For example, if there is reason to believe the lawmakers’ 
motives included a bias against the religious minority whose practices are curtailed by the 
law, we see the policy in a different light.  From this perspective it looks like the state is 
formulating public policy in a manner that hides the policy’s actual rationale.  Public 
health might remain a compelling public policy reason for the law.  Yet a neutrality test 
would highlight the objectionable motives of the lawmakers, which might suffice to 
invalidate the policy.  
If we opt for a neutrality approach to evaluating law and policy, we need to be 
clear about which aspects of public policy are subject to review by a neutrality test. Does 
neutrality apply to the motives behind state policy? Or are the effects of a policy more 
salient?  We can imagine a public health policy, such as one prohibiting the slaughter of 
animals within city limits, adopted by lawmakers in good faith who harbor no bias 
against a religious group. From the standpoint of toleration this would matter.  Yet so 
would the impact of the policy on religious citizens.  If impact is more salient than 
purpose, neutrality will protect a wider range of expressions of religious freedom.  To 
illustrate, let’s consider another example. 
Consider a federal education law that requires parents to ensure their children 
receive an adequate formal education, either in a school or at home.  Whatever the 
adequacy standard (e.g. high school diploma or equivalency, minimum competency 
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across a range of subjects) suppose the law is adopted on grounds that each citizen is 
entitled to a fair opportunity to pursue forms of employment that requires skilled labor, 
etc.  Such a policy adopted on the basis of an educational adequacy approach to state 
education policy can meet a neutrality of intent test.  Yet its effects will not be neutral 
across religious communities if one or more religious community believes that such a 
policy conflicts with religious obligation.  Neutrality of effect is a possible test for the 
fairness of such a policy.  Yet since neutrality is not a fundamental political value, there 
might be other considerations in a case like this, such as fair equality of opportunity for 
children.  If the education policy was motivated by and satisfies a fair equality of 
opportunity standard, and if this is judged to be a legitimate policy aim on grounds that 
children have rights to opportunities that would be undermined were the exemption 
granted, the religious objection to the policy is much weaker.  By contrast, suppose 
lawmakers developed an educational adequacy standard during a period of great social 
hostility towards a religious group who would have to modify its religious practices to 
comply with the adequacy standard.  Would that impact the legitimacy of the policy? 
Patten defends three ideas that are helpful as a guide to these issues.  First, neutrality 
“is a constraint that has genuine weight and reflects significant liberal values, but it 
sometimes gives way to other considerations” (Patten, 2014: 106). Second, Patten 
proposes a neutral treatment conception of neutrality.  On this view, “The state violates 
this requirement when, relative to an appropriate baseline, its policies are more 
accommodating of some considerations of the good than they are of others” (Patten, 
2014: 113). Third, persons “should be given the most extensive opportunity to pursue and 
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fulfil her ends that is justifiable given the reasonable claims of others” or FOSD (Patten, 
2017: 208).   
When we make a judgment about a state-religion policy we should consider both the 
reasons for it and its effects.  To do this we need some standard. FOSD is one proposal.  
A reason counts as neutral when it is consistent with FOSD.  This does not mean that all 
such reasons are sufficient to vindicate the policy; there are other political values that 
weigh in.  An education policy that serves a legitimate aim such as fair equality of 
opportunity might conflict with another legitimate aim such as protecting the liberty of 
parents to make decisions about their children’s education on the basis of religious 
convictions.  Judgments about cases like this will reflect views about which values weigh 
in and whether some such values override claims to religious freedom. 
FOSD is egalitarian in the following sense. FOSD is prior to neutrality. FOSD is 
among the considerations that a policy that satisfies neutrality must be compatible with; if 
a law satisfies neutrality but not FOSD, then the law could be opposed.  For instance, a 
state policy that grants religious parents exemptions from a state education policy might 
pass a neutrality test, yet run afoul of FOSD.  If students have a right to an adequate 
education, one that does not block opportunities for pursuing higher education for 
instance, then limiting parental discretion in this context may be justified.   
FOSD likewise assigns a degree of responsibility to citizens for how they exercise 
their conscience.  For example, the accommodation of a religious practice is not always 
cost free. Conscientious objector status, exemptions from health care policies, 
exemptions from motorcycle helmet laws, and tax relief alter the distribution of financial 
and other shared burdens.  FOSD can help us navigate between those practices we should 
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tolerate on grounds of liberty of conscience, and those we need not on grounds that doing 
so will impose an unfair burden on someone else. 
  A recent American Supreme Court verdict shows why these issues matter.  In 
Masterpiece Cakeshop (2018) the Court ruled in favor of a business owner who refused 
to produce a wedding cake for a same-sex couple.  At the state level the business owner 
was found to be in violation of the state of Colorado’s anti-discrimination policy.  
However, this initial verdict was judged by many to be problematic.  Much of the 
political opposition to the Colorado verdict reflected both anti-gay bias and confusion 
about the salience of liberty of conscience in the context of for-profit commercial 
activity.  Yet a legitimate concern is that agents of the state whose role is to enforce anti-
discrimination policy had expressed religious bias about a business owner who declined 
to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple.  What is the right way to handle a case in 
which representatives of the state express intolerant attitudes towards the religious 
convictions of its citizens in the course of enforcing an otherwise legitimate state policy?  
One option is to rule in favor of the business owner without striking down the anti-
discrimination policy, which is how the Court ruled.  Yet the Court could have both made 
clear that expressions of religious bias by agents are inappropriate, while at the same time 
upholding an anti-discrimination policy designed to reduce harms to an historically 
oppressed group (Macedo, 2019).  Claims for either position will not be resolved by 
appealing to the idea of toleration alone.  Patten’s framework pays off because it offers a 
way to think through conflicts with a principle, FOSD, that specifies how to give a 
number considerations, including equality and liberty of conscience, their due. 
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  Martha Nussbaum argues for a conception toleration and liberty of conscience 
based on the idea of religious equality. On her view, the tradition of religious equality in 
the American context serves as a model, albeit with the important qualification that we 
need to acknowledge the many failures to honor religious equality in practice when 
religious bigotry undermines the realization of religious equality. Moreover, Nussbaum 
does not oppose developing this model in a way that is more inclusive, for example, by 
expanding the idea of conscience to include non-religious convictions.  A secular citizen 
whose moral convictions put her at odds with a legitimate state policy should not be 
dismissed simply because the convictions are not religious.  Religious exemptions have a 
special place in Nussbaum’s view, however, in part because past instances of religious 
intolerance should inform our commitment to religious toleration, in particular, 
intolerance against religious minorities such as Mormons, Catholics, and Jews.   
The central ideas in Nussbaum’s position can be summarized as follows: 
1. Conscience is a source of purpose and meaningful conceptions of how to live. 
 
2. A free conscience permits persons to explore questions about the meaning of 
life unhindered by others and the state. 
 
3. Conscience has intrinsic value, in the same way that the capacity for 
autonomy has intrinsic value. 
 
4. Although not all values arrived at from liberty of conscience are religious 
values—e.g. a secular moral argument for pacifism can ground a legitimate 
exemption claim against mandatory service in the military—many authentic 
deliverances of conscience are religious, and religious convictions are often 
the target of state sponsored oppression and intolerance by citizens.  
Therefore, religious values hold a special place among the values people 
affirm and religious conscience serves as a model for the kinds of value 
commitments that merit special protection from government (Nussbaum, 
2008: 22-6) 
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Religious equality means that government should be neutral between religions, and 
refrain from taking sides, for example between Christianity and Islam.  This puts a strong 
burden on government to refrain from adopting policies that impact persons because of 
their religious identity.   
A religious equality approach such as Nussbaum’s offers a strong counterpoint to 
a recent Supreme Court decision that effectively blocks immigration from a number of 
Muslim majority countries.  In Trump v Hawaii (2018) the U.S. Supreme Court argued 
that despite President Trump’s numerous anti-Muslim comments, both before and during 
his presidency, the government had made an effective case for the policy on national 
security grounds. The Court further claimed that both legal precedent and the 
Constitution favor great deference to the executive branch regarding its judgments about 
national security.  It is worth noting that although a claim about religious equality might 
not override a national security argument in every instance, in this one a commitment to 
religious equality offers a compelling counterpoint.   In actuality the claim in favor of the 
restrictive immigration policy is an effort by government to rationalize religious bigotry 
with a pretense of claiming national security is the primary concern (Mahoney, 2019).  
One clear piece of evidence in favor of this assessment is the gratuitous last minute 
addition of two non-Muslim majority states—Venezuela and N. Korea—to the visa ban. 
The idea of religious equality is built around this abovementioned conception of 
conscience that is central to Nussbaum’s project.  In practice this means that a legitimate 
state can refrain from endorsing a sectarian religious viewpoint while at the same time 
affirming the value of religion as such. Sometimes American First Amendment 
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jurisprudence has followed this model, and this is the conception of religious equality that 
Nussbaum seeks to defend as on that is suitable for a liberal theory of toleration. 
Like Patten, Nussbaum is clear about priority relations among the considerations 
in play when we think about toleration and liberty of conscience.  Religious equality is 
prior to neutrality.  Stated quickly the order of ideas here runs from liberty of conscience, 
to religious equality, and then to neutrality.  Though the content of her view differs from 
Patten’s view which adapts a way of thinking about equality from theories of distributive 
justice, the architecture in both views is similar in the sense that each affirms that equality 
is more basic than neutrality.  It is a requirement of justice that government affirm a 
conception of religious equality.  Neutrality is an instrument for realizing a more 
fundamental principle; it is an instrument in the sense that it helps us consider whether 
reasons for a law or policy are consistent with a commitment to religious equality.  
Nussbaum’s position has the merit of highlighting social status inequalities that 
often harm unpopular religious minorities.  A state that affirms an ideal of religious 
equality, especially when its legal practice has a longstanding tradition of granting 
religious exemptions, can reform both its legal and political culture in ways that render its 
commitment to religious toleration more inclusive and more equalitarian.  In the 
American context a clear example is the difference in social status that is conferred by 
various forms of religious identity.  Mainline Protestant Christianity has something akin 
to an unofficial ‘first among equals status’.  Mormon, Muslim, and Native American 
religious identities often correlate with barriers to numerous opportunities which 
Episcopalian or Presbyterian citizens for example can take for granted. The legitimate 
fairness concerns raised by those who oppose favoritism towards religious over non-
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religious convictions that conflict with state policy should not detract from the ongoing 
effort to reduce the effects of religious bias.   
Some liberals oppose exemptions (Barry, 2001) while others oppose preferential 
treatment of religious convictions. (Leiter, 2012; MaClure, 2018; Perry, 2018).  Brian 
Barry argued that when a citizen has a strong argument against being required to comply 
with a law, this is a reason to rescind the law.  A religious citizen who makes a 
compelling argument against having to comply with a law on grounds of religious 
freedom is thus really providing a compelling reason for the claim that the law is 
illegitimate.  Those who oppose favoritism towards religion but not exemptions claim 
that whether a state accommodate a religious practice at odds with state policy, ought not 
to depend on whether the reasons citizens have for endorsing the practices are religious or 
non-religious.  Nussbaum’s position is much closer to the exemption paradigm that 
informs American law.  American law does not exclude non-religious exemptions, yet it 
favors religious over non-religious exemption claims as a matter of legal practice.  
III. Three Challenges 
This section explores challenging questions that can be posed to liberal conceptions 
toleration and liberty of conscience.  First, how can we formulate a conception of liberty 
of conscience that is not objectionably biased in favor of some kinds of values over 
others?  Second, should liberals claim that toleration and liberty of conscience require a 
secular state?  Third, what is best strategy for proponents of toleration and liberty of 
conscience to mitigate the problem of bias and exclusion?  
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Liberty of Conscience: Which Values Matter? In American law there is a tradition of 
favoritism for religious over non-religious exemption requests. Legal precedent is not 
uniform, but it does lean toward preferential treatment of religious over non-religious 
exemption claims.  Recent statutory law, such as the 1993 Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act (RFRA) puts a higher burden on policy which conflicts with religious convictions.  If 
a religious citizen objects to having to comply with a policy for religious reasons RFRA 
says the burden is on government to show that the policy that is being contested serves a 
‘compelling state interest’ and imposes less of a burden on the practices of the claimant 
than alternative policy options.  This level of accommodation is not guaranteed for non-
religious claimants.  Since the mid-1960’s as commentators have noted (Greenawalt, 
2006; Nussbaum, 2008) the trajectory in American law is towards a more inclusive 
conception of liberty of conscience, one that still privileges religious over non-religious 
convictions, but overtime to a lesser extent than in the past.   
Switching perspectives from law to political morality there are a range of 
positions religious exemptions (Vallier and Weber, 2018). Much of the most recent work 
on exemptions has been devoted to showing that equality and fairness in this support a 
conception of toleration that is neutral between religious and non-religious values.  Many 
who favor granting exemptions argue the state should not favor religious over non-
religious exemption requests.  This model is preferable to one that grants special 
privileges for religious exemption claims, although it too is open to objections.  
Suppose we claim that toleration is best honored if we adopt a conscience 
principle according to which citizens can sometimes be entitled to special legal 
accommodations.  Watching the World Cup and conscientious objection to military 
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service, for religious or secular moral reasons, might seem to most persons to reflect non-
moral and moral values, respectively.  Yet as Simon Cabulea May (2017) shows there are 
a range of kinds of commitments that include non-moral value commitments that are 
central to persons’ conceptions of the good.  Citizens can pursue scientific, artistic, 
intellectual, athletic, and other activities with an earnest conviction that a life with 
meaning requires unhindered opportunity to pursue such activities.  Why should their 
efforts to pursue values in the service of a meaningful life be treated as less weighty 
simply because such values are not picked out by a conscience principle that gives 
priority to moral over non-moral values?  Lacking a clear basis for sorting values into 
those which are important and those which are trivial, we will be left with a dilemma: 
either we unfairly exclude some exemption requests that should be taken seriously, or we 
face a slippery slope that will be too inclusive.  Moreover, authorizing the state to adopt a 
principle according to which some value commitments are trivial while others are 
profound comes at the risk of permitting government to adopt a sectarian position on 
matters about which reasonable citizens can disagree. 
There is reason for skepticism about a conscience principle that is neutral between 
religious and moral convictions, because it leaves important questions unsettled.  If we 
attempt to address this worry by claiming the conscience principle should treat equally 
any meaning-conferring conviction, regardless of the kind of value, the gain in inclusivity 
will be accompanied by new worries.  The legal impact of adopting an inclusive 
conscience principle would require asking whether a distinction between significant and 
trivial values can be fairly applied, and if so, how such a standard might be developed. 
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We can partly address worries about how to specify which values the conscience 
principle makes eligible as the basis for exemptions by adopting Patten’s idea of equal 
treatment and fair opportunity for self-determination.  Patten’s FOSD is neutral between 
kinds of values.  It specifies limits to accommodation in terms of costs that must be 
shouldered by others. Expecting citizens to bear some responsibility for their pursuits, 
religious or otherwise, is one way to mitigate what might reasonably be claimed to be an 
unfairness.  However, can FOSD provide guidance on how to distinguish an exemption 
request that would enable watching the World Cup from an exemption request that would 
enable someone to ride a motorcycle without a helmet because a helmet conflicts with a 
religious obligation to wear a turban?  If one worker has to forgo a day off so that her 
coworker can watch the World Cup, is she unreasonably burdened? If a Sikh is permitted 
to ride a motorcycle without a helmet is his risk of incurring higher medical expenses an 
unfair burden placed on others?  The kind of value invoked could be ignored with a 
conception of toleration instead being guided by the idea that each is entitled to a fair 
pursuit of any kind of value.   Many will be unsatisfied with this approach insofar as it 
accommodates accommodation requests for what many will regard as trivial pursuits.  
Whether the liberal state should declare something like ‘one person’s mere preference is 
another’s life-defining project’ is an interesting and open question. 
We can consider multiple policy options. For example, labor policies that specify 
the legitimate reasons for time-off from work that must be in place to accommodate the 
conscience principle.  Or raising insurance premiums for those who forgo safety 
measures for reasons of conscience.  Nevertheless, once it is claimed that toleration 
favors exemptions, questions about fairness and inclusivity are inevitable.  This does not 
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mean we should abandon the exemption approach to liberty of conscience altogether. 
Doing so on grounds that there will be intractable disagreement over which kinds of 
exemption claims have merit arguably represents reflects a sour-grapes approach to the 
political reality of hard cases.  Yet the hard questions concerning whether all, some—and 
if so which and why—values can support reasonable exemption claims remain. 
 
Does Toleration Require a Secular State? In his recent book, Islam and the Secular State, 
an-Na’im claims, “In order to be a Muslim by conviction and free choice…I need a 
secular state” (2008:1).  An-Na’im defends a Lockean argument, albeit a version that is 
more inclusive than Locke’s own position.  The main principles in an-Na’im’s view 
include first, the thesis that authentic religious conviction is incompatible with state 
enforcement of religious doctrine.  Second, religious authority does not have 
jurisdictional authority over the civil affairs that states exist to project. Third, persons can 
disagree about religion yet coexist as equal citizens.  Fourth, those Muslims who choose 
to abide by principles of Sharia can do so voluntarily.  Yet no one has the right to compel 
others to comply with religious obligations.  Though most liberal political philosophers 
do not engage questions about toleration and liberty of conscience in Muslim majority 
contexts (exceptions include Hashemi, 2009; March, 2009; Stepan, 2014), an-Na’im’s 
position represents a familiar liberal position on toleration and liberty of conscience 
adapted to Muslim majority societies.  
Is a state that does not exercise its authority on the basis of secular values 
necessarily intolerant?  To address this, it is important to bear some distinctions in mind. 
One is the difference between a just and a legitimate state.  If we interpret an-Na’im’s 
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claim to mean that a fully just state will be a secular state, his position is plausible from 
the standpoint of a liberal conception of toleration.  A just state is fully compliant with 
liberal political morality.  Real states fall short of this standard.  If any states have the 
moral authority to coerce, they must be authorized to do so despite this fact. This is one 
reason why contemporary liberal philosophers distinguish justice from political 
legitimacy (May 2009; Rawls, 2005).  A state is legitimate when it exercises is power on 
the basis of principles that reasonable persons—or some other proposed baseline that is 
lower than what an ideally just state will be based upon—can accept.  For example, a 
legitimate state is committed to restricting religious liberty only when doing so is viewed 
as necessary to protect the status of citizens as free and equal, or on the basis of the harm 
principle.   It will not seek to oppress religious minorities.  Yet a state with these 
commitments may fall short—up to a point which will be left vague here—without 
forfeiting its political authority.  There are many controversies about legitimacy and 
political authority (Huemer, 2012) yet many accept that legitimacy is a lower standard 
than justice.   
From the Rawlsian standpoint an-Na’im’s claim about religious toleration and the 
secular state is appropriate when we are thinking about the conditions for a just state.  Yet 
as Alfred Stepan (2001) and Simon Cabulea May (2009) have shown, Stepan from a 
social science perspective, May from a philosophical perspective, there are multiple 
variations on the configuration of religious and political authority within legitimate states.  
When political legitimacy is the baseline, the secular requirement is less stringent.  A 
religious democracy, understood as a state that protects religious freedom yet adopts 
some policies that reflect a majority religious viewpoint, according to this view, can 
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qualify as legitimate. Alternatively put, such a state need not be liable to revolution 
simply because it is a religious democracy. Details will matter here, yet some actual 
transitional states and May’s hypothetical example of religious democracy are compelling 
counterexamples to the claim that secularism is a condition for political legitimacy. 
A second important consideration concerns what is meant by a secular state.  An-
Na’im’s view is that a tolerant secular state is one that upholds the principle of liberty of 
conscience. In his words: 
The separation of Islam and the state is necessary for Muslims to uphold their 
genuine beliefs and to live accordingly…Historically, religious leaders were 
either enticed to cooperate with the political agenda of rulers or coerced to do so 
to avoid facing harsh consequences, as illustrated by the inquisition….I am 
calling for the separation of Islam from the state, which means that those who 
control the state cannot use its coercive powers to enforce their own beliefs. (an-
Na’im, 2008: 56). 
 
A familiar non-technical idea of a theocracy, or state whose purported authority is rooted 
in a conception of religious authority is incompatible with this idea of a secular state.  Yet 
we need a conception of political authority that is more fine-grained than one that 
distinguishes a just state from a theocracy.  If we accept a distinction between just and 
legitimate state as noted presented above, then an-Na’im’s argument can be charitably 
construed as supporting the conclusion that that a fully just state will be a secular state.  
 
Bias and Exclusion in Conceptions of Toleration and Liberty of Conscience. A third 
challenge concerns objectionable limits to liberty of conscience that are supported by 
persons or states that claim to be committed to toleration. Liberal conceptions of 
toleration need to consider how biases or insensitivities to unfairness are often 
unacknowledged. There are both theoretical and practical dimensions to this problem.  As 
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a matter of theory, the following is a useful starting point for thinking toleration and 
liberty of conscience with this concern in mind: 
Sometimes one hears reference made to the so called Enlightenment project of 
finding a philosophical secular doctrine, one founded on reason and yet 
comprehensive….Whether there is or ever was such and Enlightenment 
project…political liberalism…and justice as fairness as a form thereof has no 
such ambitions.  As I have said, political liberalism takes for granted not simply 
pluralism but the fact of reasonable pluralism; and beyond this it supposes that of 
the main existing reasonable comprehensive doctrines, some are religious.  
(Rawls, 2005: xvii) 
 
According to the conception of political morality the later Rawls endorsed, toleration 
applies, up to a point, to political philosophy itself (Rawls, 2005).  This means that those 
committed to the idea of persons as free and equal should accept that commitments to the 
values a legitimate state will rest upon can be affirmed for a variety of reasons from a 
variety of perspectives.  Pluralism applies to political philosophy’s account of what 
counts as a legitimate state.  More recent work has taken this idea further by exploring, 
for example, the relevance of political liberalism in Islam, as well as to non-Western 
contexts (Kim, 2014) that have long traditions of construing political morality in 
collectivistic rather than individualistic terms.   
Practical challenges to efforts to avoid bias in conceptions of toleration are 
equally important. Liberal political philosophers are always revising, often too slowly, 
their understanding of how to reconfigure the limits of toleration in order to reduce 
unfairness, biases that led to unjust exclusion, and to accommodate new moral insights 
that reveal unnoticed insensitivities in prevailing accounts. The effort to remedy mistakes 
rooted in prejudice and failures to acknowledge groups and individuals with interests that 
have a reasonable claim to be accommodated and affirmed as equal should be a central 
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focus of how we understood toleration.  Locke’s failures with respect to atheists and 
Catholics may have been largely remedied in subsequent liberal theory.   Yet it is the 
failures to address ways that contemporary understandings of toleration and liberty of 
conscience are compromised by unnoticed unfairness that should occupy us most when 
looking at the present, and towards the future.  Neutrality tests, Patten’s FOSD, 
Nussbaum’s religious equality approach, and other conceptions of toleration can be 
evaluated in light of how well they fare in light of how other conceptions of toleration 
have failed.  Liberal Muslims like an-Na’im make a valuable contribution by encouraging 
us to think about toleration from the standpoint of religious yet non-Christian citizens.   
Constraints on moral imagination from outright prejudice to subtle sources of bias 
that persist in spite of good faith efforts to overcome them provide compelling reasons to 
insist that whichever conception of toleration we adopt it we should do so with the full 
recognition that the political project of realizing toleration is never finished. Given 
traditions of bias in law and political culture, liberty of conscience, especially for those 
whose values and religious practices fall outside what is imagined to be ‘paradigmatic 
conceptions of religiosity’ or ‘meaningful pursuits’ should framed in a way that puts this 
concern at the center. 
IV. Future Directions 
There are many ways ideas about toleration and liberty of conscience can be developed 
beyond what has been considered here.  This concluding section will briefly state two 
examples.  One is to expand contexts to include they many perspectives on politics and 
toleration that fall outside typical discussions within liberal political philosophy.  For 
example, in addition to considering toleration and liberty of conscience in different 
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religious contexts as an-Na’im has proposed, recent work in comparative philosophy 
promises to make an important contribution to how liberal political philosophers think 
about toleration and liberty of conscience.  Other contexts include those where prevailing 
conceptions of political morality are collectivistic rather than individualistic.  Toleration 
and liberty of conscience as considered in this chapter fits squarely within a tradition of 
political morality based on the idea of value individualism: the idea that the individual 
person has rights or interests the merit special protections in the form of moral principles 
and law.  Yet in the liberal tradition value individualism reflects the impact of Protestant 
Christianity, among other sources.  Whether liberal conceptions of political morality can 
or should be adapted to the many global contexts in which religious and political history 
differ from the European experience is a pressing issue (Buchanan 2013: 249-74; Kim, 
2014). 
A second way work on toleration and liberty of conscience can be advanced 
further is by exploring ways that identity and politics inform citizens’ and governments’ 
willingness to extend toleration to each person and group.  For example, in the American 
context, the dominant Protestant religious identity, in addition to attitudes about race and 
ethnicity, informs many persons’ attitudes about toleration and liberty of context (Kazi, 
2019). Attitudes about Islam in the American context cannot be separated from the 
dominant religious identity.  When ‘we are a Christian nation’ is endorsed in contexts 
where national identity is at stake, the conflation of a legal status with a religious identity 
signals a desire to deny equal status to those with the ‘wrong kind’ of religious identity.  
When expressed inwardly to the domestic context, this has the effect of calling into 
question the loyalty of religious citizens who embrace a minority identity, such as 
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‘Muslim-American’.  When expressed outwardly, for example towards refugees, visa 
applicants, or international students, this attitude becomes a basis for exclusion.  
Consider attempts to draw an analogy between 9/11 and the Japanese attack on 
Pearl Harbor.  Though a bad analogy, one reason this is politically effective is that 
religious identity is often conflated with nationality. In the crudest form attitudes that rest 
on this conflation are expressed in slogans such as, ‘Islam hates us’ or ‘we are at war with 
Islam’. The analogy between a Muslim community center in Manhattan and a Japanese 
community center in Pearl Harbor was endorsed by many, because of this conflation of 
religious identity with nationality (Gutterman and Murphy, 2015).  Politics and reality do 
not meet here: Islam is not a nation; no state committed an act of war against the U.S. on 
9/11; and no political authority represents the world’s nearly two billion Muslim 
population.  Yet prevailing attitudes that in part reflect America’s dominant religious 
identity, along with an undercurrent of fear of Islam, combine to reinforce a status 
inequality for American Muslims. Toleration and liberty of conscience as a matter of 
principle are of course opposed to this politics.  Political philosophers can engage this 
issue is by exploring ways that identity and politics impact how people think about 
toleration.  When ‘nationality’ or some other category is really a proxy for ‘Muslim’ or 
any other religious group those who defend toleration and liberty of conscience must 
develop a clear and effective counter narrative to the political discourses that serve 
objectionable efforts to exclude. 
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